Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information?

Paul C. Tetlock
Columbia Business School

I use uniquely comprehensive data on financial news events to test four predictions from an asymmetric information model of a firm’s stock price. Certain investors trade on information before it becomes public; then, public news levels the playing field for other investors, increasing their willingness to accommodate a persistent liquidity shock. Empirically, I measure public information using firms’ stock returns on news days in the Dow Jones archive. I find four patterns in postnews returns and trading volume that are consistent with the asymmetric information model’s predictions. Some evidence is, moreover, inconsistent with alternative theories in which traders interpret news differently for rational or behavioral reasons. (JEL G14)

This study uses 29 years of data on all publicly traded U.S. firms in the Dow Jones (DJ) news archive to examine how firms’ information environments change during 2.2 million news events. This is one of the largest quantitative records of financial news events ever constructed, allowing for a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the role of news in stock pricing. I propose and test a model of a firm’s stock price in which a public news story eliminates an information asymmetry between two groups of traders. Before the news, one investor group has superior information but also incurs a persistent liquidity shock. The news story then informs the relatively uninformed investor group, making them less wary of providing liquidity to the informed traders; because they are risk averse, the relatively uninformed investors do not fully accommodate the liquidity shock on the day of the news event. This theoretical model is similar to the Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Wang (1994), Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), and Llorente et al. (2002) (hereafter LMSW) models but differs in its explicit assumptions about the role and timing of public news.

Paul Tetlock is the Roger F. Murray Associate Professor of Finance at Columbia Business School. I thank Wes Chan, Kent Daniel, Larry Glosten, Amit Goyal, Gur Huberman, Charles Jones, Eric Kelley, Anthony Lynch, Chris Parsons, Paolo Pasquariello, Gideon Saar, Mark Seasholes, Matthew Spiegel, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Heather Tookes, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Columbia University, Global Alpha, the HKUST Asset Pricing Symposium, the NBER Microstructure meetings, the NY Fed, NYU, Princeton, UNC, and the WFA meetings for their comments. I am grateful to Dow Jones for providing access to their news archive. Send correspondence to Paul Tetlock, Uris Hall 811, Columbia Business School, New York, NY 10027; telephone: (212) 854-1901. E-mail: paul.tetlock@columbia.edu.

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This article’s contribution is to test four predictions from this model using uniquely comprehensive news data, along with firms’ stock returns and trading activity. The model’s first prediction is that the firm’s return on a news day positively predicts its returns after the news. The intuition is that the gradual dissipation of the liquidity shock after the news leads to return momentum. Second, returns on high-volume news days are better positive predictors of postnews returns than returns on low-volume news days. The reason is that news that resolves more asymmetric information facilitates more absorption of the prenews liquidity shock, resulting in both higher trading volume at the time of news and higher return momentum after news.

Third, the contemporaneous correlation between the firm’s trading volume and the magnitude of its price changes temporarily increases around news days. As news occurs, both volume and price changes are driven by the belief revisions of uninformed investors, because informed investors already know the news. The uninformed investors increase (decrease) their stock holdings when they learn from the news that the stock’s expected returns are higher (lower), producing a high correlation between volume and the magnitude of price changes on news days. Fourth, the price impact of informed trading in the firm’s stock temporarily decreases as news reduces information asymmetry.

I measure public news events using the entire DJ archive, which includes all DJ newswire and all Wall Street Journal (WSJ) stories about publicly traded U.S. firms from 1979 to 2007. I compare stock returns and trading activity on news days and nonnews days using daily cross-sectional regressions in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973). This analysis produces four main results: (i) ten-day reversals of daily returns are 38% lower on news days; (ii) ten-day volume-induced momentum in daily returns exists only on news days for many stocks; (iii) the cross-sectional correlation between the absolute value of firms’ abnormal returns and abnormal turnover is temporarily higher by 35% on news days; and (iv) the price impact of order flow is temporarily lower by 3.3% on news days. These four findings suggest that some traders have already acted on the information released by public news, whereas other traders use news to learn about expected returns. The second and third empirical findings are novel, whereas the first and fourth findings significantly extend previous results.1

Although these four qualitative results are robust over time and across stocks with different characteristics, the magnitudes of the effects vary substantially. News is a better predictor of reduced return reversal in small firms, which suggests that each news story conveys more information for these firms. The link between news and reduced return reversal is also stronger for stories that

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1 Karpoff (1987) and others find a robust positive correlation between volume and absolute price changes. Smirlock and Starks (1988) show that this relationship is particularly strong around earnings announcements for 300 firms spanning 49 trading days, but they do not investigate other news events.
consist of many newswire messages and earnings-related words, which are plausible proxies for the information content of news.

For small stocks and illiquid stocks, volume-induced return momentum occurs only on news days, whereas volume-induced reversal occurs on other days. This could indicate that public news resolves more asymmetric information in these firms. The correlation between absolute returns and volume declines by a larger amount following news stories that consist of many newswire messages and earnings-related words, and for small stocks and illiquid stocks. This suggests that the role of public information in resolving privately held differences in opinion is stronger for small stocks and illiquid stocks. Conversely, I find no clear evidence that news predicts return reversals, which are typically associated with the arrival of liquidity shocks. One interpretation is that the release of news coincides with information more often than it coincides with liquidity shocks.

Several empirical design choices minimize the likelihood that the results are spurious. First, I focus on weekly time horizons for return reversals because the evidence in studies by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) shows that weekly return reversals dominate one-day autocorrelations. In these tests, I skip day 1 to avoid microstructure biases, such as bid-ask bounce, that affect return correlations in consecutive periods.2

Second, I present the four main results for firms in the top and bottom size and liquidity quintiles separately based on the LMSW (2002) findings that these stocks’ information environments differ. Although the effects are often stronger for small and illiquid stocks, all four results hold in both groups. This demonstrates that the results are statistically robust and economically important. At the same time, the consistently stronger findings for small stocks and illiquid stocks hint at a role for information asymmetry. By contrast, the main results are never stronger and are sometimes actually weaker for stocks with high analyst forecast dispersion and low institutional ownership. This variation is inconsistent with several alternative theories in which investors interpret news differently for rational or irrational reasons, such as those of Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Harris and Raviv (1993).

Third, I use daily cross-sectional regressions—in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973)—to control for a wide range of influences on firms’ stock returns. The regressions simultaneously test the model’s first two predictions for expected returns while controlling for other well-known predictors of returns, such as size, book-to-market, return momentum, return volatility, abnormal turnover, and several other variables. I present these regressions separately for

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2 Another benefit is that the holding period return excludes the positive one-day autocorrelation that Sias and Starks (1997) link to institutional ownership. It is possible that institutional order splitting across days causes two-day price pressure that reverses at longer horizons. Indeed, recent evidence from Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) demonstrates that price pressure from trading clienteles develops and subsides over multiweek horizons. Accordingly, I explicitly analyze whether institutional ownership affects the results.
firms that differ in alternative measures of the information environment such as analyst coverage to ensure that news is distinct from other proxies for information asymmetry.

This article contributes to three literatures. One is the volume-induced return reversal literature, which includes a complex set of results. Whereas Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) show that return reversals for relatively small Nasdaq stocks decrease with trading volume, Cooper (1999) shows that return reversals for larger NYSE stocks increase with trading volume. Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) find that volume-induced return reversal increases with stock illiquidity. I confirm that large stocks and liquid stocks exhibit volume-induced momentum, whereas small stocks and illiquid stocks exhibit unconditional volume-induced reversals. I find, however, that small stocks and illiquid stocks actually exhibit volume-induced return momentum on public news days, just as large stocks and liquid stocks do on all days. The findings here complement the volume-induced reversal findings in LMSW (2002). Whereas LMSW do not directly measure firms’ information environments, I analyze the impact of public news releases on volume-induced and unconditional return reversals. I also investigate how the correlation between absolute returns and volume changes and how price impact changes around public news events. The upshot is that I provide new evidence on how investors obtain information that is relevant for firm valuation and which public signals resolve information asymmetries across investors.

This article also contributes to a growing literature on the impact of public news releases, which includes Stickel and Verrecchia (1994), Pritamani and Singal (2001), Chan (2003), Chae (2005), Vega (2006), Chava and Tookes (2007), Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008). Of these papers, Chan (2003) and Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) are most closely related to this study. The first result in this article extends the monthly and weekly findings in Chan (2003) and Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) to daily return reversals around public news. This is not trivial, because the correlations between daily returns on news days and weekly and monthly returns surrounding public news are only 0.560 and 0.299, respectively. Interestingly, these correlations are 0.618 and 0.350 on news days with positive abnormal turnover but just 0.321 and 0.120 on other news days. Neither Chan (2003) nor Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) explores this link between trading activity and returns on news days. By contrast, I analyze whether news predicts changes in volume-induced return momentum, the correlation between absolute returns and volume, and price impact.

This study differs from those by Stickel and Verrecchia (1994), Pritamani and Singal (2001), Vega (2006), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), and Tetlock (2010) because it compares high-frequency return reversals on news and nonnews days. All of these earlier studies analyze reversals
and momentum solely on news days, and the first three look at only earnings news. This study’s evidence on return predictability complements the evidence by Chae (2005) and Chava and Tookes (2007), who analyze mainly trading volume around news events. This study differs from that by Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) and Tetlock (2010) in its comparison of news and nonnews events and its use of news data on the entire cross-section of publicly traded firms.

A third related literature examines intraday responses to public information—e.g., by Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1999), Green (2004), and Pasquariello and Vega (2007). The empirical focus of this article on daily expected returns, correlations between returns and volume, and price impacts differs from the microstructure emphasis on intraday spreads and depths. A key reason is that the time stamp of a news release, even though it is precise, often does not match the intraday timing of the underlying information event. Thus, I focus on daily market reactions to news because news usually occurs on the same day as the information event. A benefit of testing the daily expected return predictions of microstructure theory is that these predictions receive less attention in the recent empirical literature on public information events.

Although this article adopts an identification strategy based on a rational market microstructure model, one could frame many of the empirical results as tests of behavioral asset pricing theories. The two classes of models are not mutually exclusive because specific behavioral biases could motivate the “liquidity” trading in microstructure models. For example, one could relate the results here on return reversals, volume-induced momentum, and the correlation between absolute returns and volume to predictions in the over- and underreaction models of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999). This behavioral interpretation, however, does not seem necessary because the rational paradigm appears to explain the data and because none of the four news effects is significantly stronger in stocks with low institutional ownership.

I now provide a brief overview of the article. In Section 1, I introduce a simple model of how news resolves information asymmetries that makes four empirical predictions. In Section 2, I describe the key empirical measures and present several summary statistics. In Section 3, I use regressions to estimate return reversal and volume-induced reversal on news days and nonnews days.

3 Stickel and Verrecchia (1994) show that post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) increases with announcement-day trading volume. Vega (2006) shows that PEAD is higher for firms with low measures of PIN (private information), differences of opinion on public news days, and low media coverage. Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) show that the words in public news releases predict firms’ future cash flows and their stock returns, albeit briefly. Tetlock (2010) finds that news day return reversal is higher when prior news, high return volatility, or high liquidity precedes the news day.
I present the correlations between absolute returns and volume and the price impact results in Section 4. I provide a concluding discussion of the results in Section 5.

1. A Stylized Model in Which Public News Resolves Information Asymmetry

The model here inherits its key economic features from Wang (1994) and LMSW (2002) but makes additional assumptions about the role and timing of public news stories. The model features three trading periods, two groups of investors, one risky asset, and one risk-free asset. As in Wang (1994), one investor group (i) has a temporary informational advantage but also incurs a privately observed liquidity or endowment shock. This group combines the traditional roles of informed traders and liquidity traders, who introduce noise. The other investor group (u) is relatively uninformed but is also rational. Each group comprises many investors who behave competitively as price takers. All investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions defined over consumption in period 3, after the risky asset’s liquidating dividend occurs. The CARA assumption implies that investors’ asset demands do not depend on their wealth.

In periods 0, 1, and 2, both investor groups myopically choose how much to invest in the risky and risk-free assets. In period 3, they consume their wealth, which depends on the risky asset’s liquidating dividend. The myopia assumption increases tractability but does not affect the model’s qualitative predictions. For simplicity, the risk-free asset pays a zero rate of return and there is no time discounting. The risky asset supply is normalized to one unit; the supply of the risk-free asset is perfectly elastic; and both investors have risk aversion equal to one.

The informed investors receive a signal in period 1 (s1) about the firm’s liquidating dividend \(d_3 = d + s_1 + e_1 + e_2 + e_3\) that occurs in time 3, where \(d\) is a constant. The signal is normally distributed according to \(s_1 \sim N(0, V_s)\). Each of the three random components of the dividend is independently normally distributed according to \(e_t \sim N(0, V_e)\) and is revealed publicly in period \(t\), where \(t = 1, 2,\) or 3. In period 2, a public news announcement reveals the signal (s1) to the uninformed investors.

In period 1, the informed investors incur a persistent liquidity shock to their endowments of stock holdings equal to \(n_1\) per investor, which is normally distributed according to \(n_1 \sim N(0, V_n)\). Importantly, this shock persists until after period 2, when the news occurs. Although the uninformed investors do not observe this liquidity shock, they make rational inferences about its value based on the observed market price in period 1 \(p_1\) and the initially private signal \(s_1\) that becomes public in period 2. A natural interpretation of the model is that the uninformed investors are risk-averse market makers, who act competitively and rationally.

The time line below summarizes the key events in the model:
One can compute the equilibrium using standard backward induction techniques. Denote investors’ demand functions in period $t$ by $x_{it}$ and $x_{ut}$. From the myopic CARA assumption, informed demand per investor, excluding the liquidity shock, is

$$x_{it} = E_{it}(p_{t+1} + 1) - p_t \frac{\text{Var}_{it}(p_{t+1})}{\text{Var}_{it}(p_{t+1})},$$

(1)

where the $it$ subscripts denote investor group $i$’s conditional expectations based on information available at time $t$. Demand for each investor in the uninformed group is the same, except that the $i$ subscripts are $u$ subscripts. To obtain the two group demands, one multiplies the individual investor demands by the total group sizes, which are $m$ for the informed and $(1 - m)$ for the uninformed.

By setting demand equal to supply in period 2, I solve for the equilibrium market price:

$$p_2 = d - V_e + e_1 + e_2 + s_1 + mV_e n_1,$$

(2)

The news release allows investors to perfectly infer the value of the private liquidity shock ($n_1$), making it effectively publicly observable. As in the model by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), a publicly observable liquidity shock has a temporary impact on the stock price.

I look for an equilibrium in period 1 in which $p_1$ is linear in $s_1$ and $n_1$:

$$p_1 = a + e_1 + b_s s_1 + b_n n_1,$$

(3)

where the equilibrium values of the signal and liquidity shock coefficients ($b_s$ and $b_n$) will be determined below. Anticipating the linear form of the pricing function, the uninformed investors use the observed price to learn about $s_1$ and $n_1$. Applying the market clearing condition in period 1, solving for the equilibrium price, and matching the three pricing coefficients on the constant, signal, and liquidity shock terms yields the solutions

$$0 < b_s(m, V_s, V_n, V_e) = \frac{V_s (1 + mV_e V_n V_e) + 2m(1 + m)V_e^2 V_n}{V_s (1 + mV_e V_n V_e) + (1 + m)^2 V_e^2 V_n} < 1$$

(4)
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\[ mV_e < b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e) \]
\[ = (1 + m)V_e \frac{V_s (1 + mV_e V_n V_e) + 2m(1 + m)V_e^2 V_n}{V_s (1 + mV_e V_n V_e) + (1 + m)^2 V_e^2 V_n} < 2mV_e \]  
(5)

\[ a = d - 2V_e - \frac{(1 - m)V_e^2 V_n V_s}{V_s (1 + mV_e V_n V_e) + (1 + m)^2 V_e^2 V_n}. \]  
(6)

Applying the market clearing condition in period 0, when there is symmetric information and no liquidity shocks have occurred, the initial price is

\[ p_0 = d - 3V_e - (b_s^2 V_s + b_n^2 V_n). \]  
(7)

One can use the pricing and demand equations above to compute abnormal returns and volume in periods 1 and 2. The period 2 abnormal return \((r_2)\) is the unexpected difference in prices:

\[ r_2 = E(p_2 - p_1 - E(p_2 - p_1)) \]
\[ = (1 - b_s(m, V_s, V_n, V_e))s_1 + (mV_e - b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e))n_1 + e_2. \]  
(8)

Similarly, the period 3 abnormal return \((r_3)\) is

\[ r_3 = E(p_3 - p_2 - E(p_3 - p_2)) = e_3 - mV_e n_1. \]  
(9)

To compare firms in the news with those out of the news, I analyze the model’s comparative statics with respect to \(V_s\) in the parameter region where \(V_s\) approaches zero. This region is appropriate for analyzing the impact of a single daily news story that represents a small fraction of a firm’s total return variance. I also verify in simulations that the theoretical results below hold for larger changes in \(V_s\). Because increasing \(V_s\) holding the other parameters fixed increases the firm’s total return variance, I conduct further simulations in which reductions in \(V_e\) exactly offset the effect of increasing \(V_s\) on return variance. None of the comparative statics below change in this specification.

The model’s first two empirical predictions focus on expected postnews returns \((r_3)\). Using the return equations for \(r_2\) and \(r_3\) above, we compute the return predictability coefficient:

\[ \frac{Cov(r_3, r_2)}{Var(r_2)} = \frac{mV_e (b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e) - mV_e) V_n}{(1 - b_s(m, V_s, V_n, V_e)) V_s + V_e + (b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e) - mV_e)^2 V_n} > 0, \]  
(10)

The derivative of this expression with respect to \(V_s\) is positive at \(V_s = 0\), as Proposition 1 states:
Proposition 1. The regression coefficient of postnews ($r_3$) returns on news-event returns ($r_2$) increases with the informativeness of news ($V_s$).

The reason is that news, by resolving information asymmetry in period 2, induces the uninformed investors to partially accommodate the (period 1) liquidity shock from informed investors. In period 3, the remainder of the liquidity shock dissipates. The gradual accommodation of the same (period 1) liquidity shock in periods 2 and 3 is what causes the positive covariance in returns in periods 2 and 3. Empirically, I compare return autocorrelations for firms with and without news on the same day.

The model’s second and third empirical predictions are based on the fact that trading volume in the news period increases with the informativeness of news ($V_s$). I compute the abnormal trading volume in period 2 ($T_2$) as the absolute value of the unexpected change in the informed investor group’s holdings between periods 1 and 2:

$$T_2 = |m(x_{2i} - x_{1i} - E(x_{2i} - x_{1i}))| = \frac{m}{V_e} |[1 - b_s(m, V_s, V_n, V_e)] s_1 + [2m V_e - b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e)] n_1|.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

Equation (11) shows that trading volume has a folded normal distribution, where the variance of the underlying normal is proportional to $[1 - b_s(m, V_s, V_n, V_e)]^2 V_s + [2m V_e - b_n(m, V_s, V_n, V_e)]^2 V_n$. Using the standard expression for the expectation of a folded normal variable, one can show that the derivative of expected abnormal trading volume with respect to news informativeness ($V_s$) evaluated at $V_s = 0$ is strictly positive, as Proposition 2 states.

Proposition 2. Expected trading volume ($T_2$) increases with the informativeness of news ($V_s$).

Empirically, news is often a binary (0 or 1) variable that is only positively correlated with the underlying informativeness of news ($V_s$). Proposition 2 suggests that the extent of trading volume is a complementary proxy for $V_s$, identifying news days that coincide with more resolution of asymmetric information and more absorption of the liquidity shock. Thus, the model’s second prediction is that the return predictability coefficient in Equation (10) and Proposition 1 increases with the amount of trading volume on a news day.

A second implication of the trading volume equation is that the correlation between volume and the absolute value of returns in the news-event period increases with the informativeness of news. The correlation between absolute returns and volume is given by

$$Corr(T_2, |r_2|) = (2 \sin (\arccos(-\rho)) + 2 \rho \arccos(-\rho) - \rho \pi - 2)/ (\pi - 2),$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)
where $\rho = Corr(m(x_{2i} - x_{1i}) - E(x_{2i} - x_{1i})), r_2)$. The correlation unambiguously increases with news informativeness at $V_s = 0$:

$$\frac{\partial Corr(T_2, r_2)}{\partial V_s} = \frac{2 \arccos(-\rho) - \pi}{\pi - 2} \frac{d\rho}{dV_s} > 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Both terms in Equation (13) are negative at $V_s = 0$, implying that their product is positive.

**Proposition 3.** The correlation between trading volume and absolute returns in the news-event period increases with news informativeness ($V_s$).

The intuition is that news simultaneously reveals informed traders’ signal ($s_1$) and the value of the persistent liquidity shock ($n_1$) to previously uninformed investors. If they learn that the shock is negative (positive), then future expected returns will be higher (lower) than expected, motivating uninformed investors to partially accommodate the shock. That is, the revelation of the signal through news facilitates the absorption of the liquidity shock. More unexpected news leads to both larger price changes and increased accommodation of the liquidity shock at the time of the news.

Finally, I examine the price impact of informed trading, which is defined as the regression coefficient of returns on informed order flows. In the news period, price impact is

$$\frac{Cov(r_2, x_{2i} - x_{1i} - E(x_{2i} - x_{1i}))}{Var(x_{2i} - x_{1i} - E(x_{2i} - x_{1i}))} = \frac{V_e}{m} \frac{-(1 - b_s)^2 V_s + (2mV_e - b_n)(b_n - mV_e)V_n}{(1 - b_s)^2 V_s + (2mV_e - b_n)^2 V_n}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

The first term in the expression above shows that the impact of increasing the variance of the signal ($V_s$) is to reduce price impact in period 2, as stated in Proposition 4:

**Proposition 4.** Price impact in the news-event period decreases with news informativeness ($V_s$).

To see the intuition, suppose that there will be important news released in period 2. Before this news is released, in period 1, informed traders face a high cost of meeting their liquidity needs, leading them to trade more on information and less on liquidity. When the news arrives, however, informed traders will unwind their information-based trades and trade solely for liquidity reasons, making their price impact appear low. Thus, the fourth prediction of the model is that the price impact of informed trading decreases as news resolves asymmetric information. Empirically, I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm for signing order flow to identify informed trades. This identification...
approach is valid if the informed group trades more aggressively than the uninformed group, who effectively act as market makers in this model.

2. Data Description

The primary data source is the DJ news archive, which contains all DJ News Service and all WSJ stories from 1979 to 2007. For each news story in the archive, there are often multiple newswire messages corresponding to separate paragraphs that DJ releases individually. I use the DJ firm code identifier at the beginning of each newswire to assess whether a story mentions a publicly traded U.S. firm. Unfortunately, my manual review of the news stories prior to November 1996 reveals that stories without any firm codes sometimes mention U.S. firms—i.e., the DJ firm codes contain measurement error. More seriously, DJ may back-fill firm codes prior to November 1996 in a systematic fashion that introduces survivorship bias into the data. This survivorship bias does not seem to affect stories after November 1996. Between 95% and 99% of sample firms have news coverage in each year after 1996.

Subperiod analyses—most of which appear in the tables that follow—show that all the main results hold before and after 1996. Using other subperiod cutoffs does not affect these findings. In general, the results are either similar or somewhat stronger in the 1997 to 2007 period that is not subject to survivorship bias. The fact that survivorship bias does not strengthen the results may be attributable to this article’s focus on high-frequency return, volume, volatility, and news measures that do not depend heavily on accurate estimates of stocks’ long-run expected returns.

I explicitly examine the relationship between stocks’ long-run returns and media coverage to gauge the potential impact of the survivorship bias. I am able to replicate the key finding by Fang and Peress (2009) that one-month expected returns are lower for stocks with some media coverage. If anything, this effect is slightly larger in the current dataset, which suggests that survivorship bias does not materially affect expected returns. This result also mitigates broader concerns about survivorship bias because one-month returns are more likely than daily or weekly returns to show evidence of survivorship bias.

The main regression tests use data on news, returns, volume, and firm characteristics. The measure of firm-specific news coverage is an indicator variable \( News_{it} = 0 \) or \( 1 \) that is equal to one if firm \( i \) ’s DJ code appears in any stories in the archive between the close of trading day \( t - 1 \) and the close of trading day \( t \). I match the DJ firm codes to U.S. ticker symbols in the database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) by trading date. I match each firm’s news and returns data to accounting (Compustat), analyst forecast (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System), institutional holdings (Thomson 13(f)), and stock transaction data (NYSE Trade and Quote database [TAQ]).

The analysis below focuses on economically important firms with reliably measured trading returns. The sample includes only stocks with positive trading
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volume on all days from $t - 60$ to $t - 1$, and stocks with prices that exceed $5$ on day $t - 1$. These requirements eliminate many small and illiquid firms, most of which have very few news stories anyway. The sample includes only U.S. firms with common equity (share codes 10 or 11 in CRSP) listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or Amex exchanges. After imposing these requirements, 13,842 unique firms appear at some point in the 29-year sample. Of these firms, 9,452 have news stories on at least one trading day. This 68% coverage is considerably higher than that in Fang and Peress (2009) but somewhat lower than coverage in Chan (2003). The missing firm codes in the pre-1997 DJ archive appear to account for the discrepancy with Chan (2003).

Figure 1 depicts the monthly average of the daily percentage of eligible firms covered in the DJ archive. Between 2% and 5% of firms appear in the archive on most days in the 1980s, whereas 20% to 35% of firms are mentioned on most days in the post-2000 period. I also compute three long-horizon coverage measures for trading days that meet the sample inclusion criteria: the

![Figure 1](https://example.com/figure1.png)

**Figure 1**

*Media coverage across firms and over time*

Figure 1 depicts how four media coverage measures change from 1979 to 2007. The bottom line is the monthly average of the daily fraction of sample eligible firms that have news in the DJ archive—see text for sample construction. The other three lines are three long-horizon coverage measures that include media coverage on trading days that meet the sample inclusion criteria. The top two lines represent the fraction of firms with at least one news story in the current month, and the fraction of firms with news in the most recent 12 months. The second line from the bottom is the fraction of trading days in the most recent 12 months that a firm appears in the news for the firm at the 90th percentile. This line represents news coverage for the most widely followed firms.
percentage of firms with at least one news story in the current month; the percentage with news in the most recent 12 months; and the percentage of trading days in the most recent 12 months that the firm at the 90th percentile appears in the news. This last measure shows how news coverage evolves for the most widely followed firms. All four coverage measures increase over time, and the yearly coverage measure jumps to over 95% shortly after November 1996. In 1980, news stories occur on 10% of trading days for the firm in the 90th percentile of coverage; in 2007, they occur on 60% of trading days.

3. The Impact of News on Return Reversals

3.1 Regression Estimates

In the model in Section 1 and in several related models, liquidity shocks predict larger return reversals, and the release of information predicts smaller return reversals. To evaluate whether public news coincides with liquidity or informational shocks, I examine whether news on day $t$ predicts a larger or smaller reversal of firm $i$’s day-$t$ excess stock return ($Ret_{it}$). For simplicity, I define $Ret_{it}$ as the firm’s raw day-$t$ return minus the value-weighted market return. The dependent variable is the firm’s ten-day raw return from trading day $t + 2$ through day $t + 10$ ($Ret_{it,t+2,t+10}$), where I omit day $t + 1$ to mitigate bid-ask bounce. The ten-day horizon matches earlier papers (e.g., Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy 2008) that explore return momentum around news. The results are very similar with a five-day horizon. I define $Ret_{it,t+2,t+10}$ using raw returns for ease of interpretation. The results below are not sensitive to the specific risk benchmarks chosen because the regressions include controls for several firm characteristics and because short-horizon return predictability is often robust to benchmark selection (Fama 1998).

The controls for firm characteristics that predict expected returns include monthly measures of firm size ($Size_{it}$), book-to-market ($BM_{it}$) ratio, yearly return momentum excluding the most recent calendar month ($Mom_{it}$), and average daily return volatility during the previous calendar month ($TVol_{it}$) using standard techniques. I define the size and book-to-market variables as do Fama and French (1992), the momentum variable as do Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and the total volatility variable as do Ang et al. (2006). Most regression specifications include abnormal turnover ($Turn_{it}$) to control for the high-volume return premium of Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001). For consistency, I use the same turnover variable in the interaction terms below that measure volume-induced reversal. Thus, I use the abnormal turnover definition from Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993): the log of daily turnover (share volume over shares outstanding), detrended using a rolling 60-day average of log turnover.

4 To reduce positive skewness, I compute the logarithms of the size, book-to-market, momentum, and volatility variables. I add constants ($k$) before computing the log of each variable ($x$) so that the slope of $\ln(k + x)$ is equal to one when $x$ is evaluated at the variable’s unconditional sample mean. This does not affect the results.
In all regressions, the set of independent variables includes the news indicator \( (\text{News}_{it}) \) and an interaction between news and day-\(t\) excess returns \( (\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \). Because news coverage is strongly related to firm size (e.g., Chan 2003; Vega 2006; Engelberg 2008; Fang and Peress 2009), I include an additional variable \( (\text{size}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \) to control for possible interactions between size and reversals. To reduce multicollinearity with the size interaction \( (\text{size}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \), I demean \( \text{News}_{it} \) by size quintile on each day \( t \) before computing the news interaction term \( (\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \). I also demean \( \text{Size}_{it} \) by the mean size for all firms in the sample on each day \( t \) before computing the size interaction term \( (\text{size}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \). Lowercase letters denote the demeaned news and size variables. Throughout this article, I demean all independent variables before computing interaction terms. The only exceptions are abnormal turnover and excess returns, which both already have means approximately equal to zero by construction.

The regression includes an interaction term to control for volume-induced momentum \( (\text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \), because news and volume are correlated. It also includes an interaction term between news and turnover \( (\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it}) \) as a control, in case the high-volume return premium depends on the occurrence of news. I also include a triple interaction term \( (\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}) \) to assess whether volume-induced return reversal depends on news. This coefficient estimate is the basis for testing two auxiliary predictions of the theory that news resolves asymmetric information: First, volume-induced return reversals (momentum) will be lower (higher) on days with news; second, the impact of news on volume-induced return reversals will be larger for stocks with higher information asymmetry. The complete regression specification is

\[
\text{Ret}_{i,t+2,t+10} = a + b_1 \times \text{Ret}_{it} + b_2 \times \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} + b_3 \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \\
+ b_4 \times \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} + c \times \text{Controls}_{it} \\
+ e_{it} \text{ for all } i \text{ on each day } t,
\]

where \( \text{Controls}_{it} = [\text{News}_{it}, \text{size}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}, \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it}, \text{Turn}_{it}, \text{Size}_{it}, \text{BM}_{it}, \text{Mom}_{it}, \text{TVol}_{it}]^T \) is an \( 8 \times 1 \) column vector and \( c \) is a \( 1 \times 8 \) row vector of coefficients. The news-related reversal and news-related volume-induced reversal coefficients \( (b_2 \text{ and } b_4) \) are the focus of this section.

In the spirit of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method for estimating expected returns, I estimate Equation (15) daily using the cross-section of all firms on each day. Using data from all days increases the efficiency of the regression estimates relative to throwing away data (e.g., Hansen and Hodrick 1980), which would be necessary if I used weekly or biweekly regressions. I compute the full sample coefficient estimate as the time series average of

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5 The regression results based on the raw news variable are qualitatively similar.
the daily cross-sectional regression coefficients. Using an unweighted average disregards the standard error of each daily coefficient estimate, which is generally inefficient. Instead, I weight each daily coefficient estimate using the inverse of the variance of the daily coefficient, as suggested in Ferson and Harvey (1999). Because consecutive daily estimates are based on return observations with overlapping nine-day time horizons, the daily estimates of the cross-sectional regression coefficients are positively autocorrelated. Thus, I compute Newey and West (1987) standard errors that are robust to autocorrelation up to ten daily lags and heteroscedasticity in the daily coefficient estimates. Using additional lags has no material impact on the inferences.

Table 1 reports coefficient estimates for all variables in Equation (15). The first key result is that the coefficient on the news interaction term ($\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$) is positive, statistically significant, and economically significant. Reversals on days [2,10] of returns on day 0 are 4.2% lower when news occurs on day 0. By contrast, the size of the average reversal—represented by the coefficient on $\text{Ret}_{it}$—is 9.8% of the day 0 return. Using the coefficients on $\text{Ret}_{it}$, $\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$, $\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$, and $\text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$, along with the average values of $\text{news}_{it}$, $\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it}$, and $\text{Turn}_{it}$ on news days and nonnews days, the reversal on news and nonnews days are equal to $-6.4\%$ and $-10.2\%$ of the daily return, respectively. This implies that the reversal of day 0 returns is 38% lower if news occurs on day 0. One can also compare the reversal sizes in basis points rather than percentages of daily returns. The standard deviation of returns on news days is 3.85%, whereas the standard deviation on nonnews days is 2.75%. Multiplying these standard deviations by the percentage reversals above, one sees that the news day return reversal of 39 basis points (bps) is over 31% lower than the nonnews day reversal of 56 bps. The observed difference of 17 bps in the news and nonnews return reversals understates the importance of public information arrival if the news indicator variable is a noisy proxy for public information. The results in subsequent tests that allow reversal to depend on public news characteristics support this view.

The second main result in Table 1 is that the regression coefficient on the $\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$ variable is consistently positive, statistically significant, and economically significant. The fourth row in Table 1 shows five regression specifications that differ in whether they exclude earnings or nonearnings news and in which period they cover. The robustness in the $\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}$ coefficients indicates that neither earnings news nor survivorship bias drives the results. To gauge the economic impact of news on volume-induced momentum, consider an increase in turnover from the 10th to the 90th percentile of its distribution conditional on news. This increase in turnover leads to a 3.2% increase in turnover from months with fewer than 100 firm-days with news stories. This criterion binds only when I divide the sample by firm size, liquidity, analyst coverage, and other characteristics. Even though the standard error of each daily coefficient is biased downward, using the standard errors as weights does not induce a bias in the weighted average if the downward bias is proportional. The reason is that the average weighting cancels in the numerator and denominator of the weighted average.
Table 1

The impact of news on return reversal and volume-induced return momentum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ret_{it}</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
<td>-0.084**</td>
<td>-0.100**</td>
<td>-0.125**</td>
<td>-0.067**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>news_{it}*Ret_{it}</td>
<td>0.042**</td>
<td>0.084**</td>
<td>0.029**</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn_{it}*Ret_{it}</td>
<td>0.0088**</td>
<td>0.0058**</td>
<td>0.0084**</td>
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<td>0.0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>news_{it}*Turn_{it}*Ret_{it}</td>
<td>0.0188**</td>
<td>0.0091*</td>
<td>0.0174**</td>
<td>0.0172**</td>
<td>0.0193**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size_{it}*Ret_{it}</td>
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<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0051**</td>
<td>-0.0092**</td>
<td>-0.0025</td>
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<td>News_{it}</td>
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<td>-0.0005*</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>news_{it}*Turn_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0007*</td>
<td>-0.0005*</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
<td>-0.0007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn_{it}</td>
<td>0.0023**</td>
<td>0.0020**</td>
<td>0.0023**</td>
<td>0.0022**</td>
<td>0.0024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size_{it}</td>
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<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0004*</td>
<td>-0.0004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM_{it}</td>
<td>0.0018**</td>
<td>0.0020**</td>
<td>0.0019**</td>
<td>0.0019**</td>
<td>0.0018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mom_{it}</td>
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<td>0.0060**</td>
<td>0.0067**</td>
<td>0.0078**</td>
<td>0.0055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVol_{it}</td>
<td>-0.115**</td>
<td>-0.099**</td>
<td>-0.115**</td>
<td>-0.132**</td>
<td>-0.101**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average R²</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg obs per day</td>
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<td>2271</td>
<td>2222</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days</td>
<td>7098</td>
<td>4432</td>
<td>7096</td>
<td>4335</td>
<td>2763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reports all of the estimated coefficients from the regression in Equation (15) in the text:

\[
Ret_{it+2,t+10} = a + b_1 \times Ret_{it} + b_2 \times news_{it} \times Ret_{it} + b_3 \times Turn_{it} \times Ret_{it} + b_4 \times news_{it} \times Turn_{it} \times Ret_{it} + c \times Controls_{it} + e_{it},
\]

where Controls_{it} = [News_{it}, size_{it}*Ret_{it}, news_{it}*Turn_{it}, Turn_{it}, Size_{it}, BM_{it}, Mom_{it}, TVol_{it}]^T. The dependent variable (Ret_{it+2,t+10}) is the firm’s raw return from day t + 2 to t + 10. The independent variables include day-t market-adjusted returns (Ret_{it}); the news indicator (News_{it}); abnormal turnover (Turn_{it}); interactions between news and returns (news_{it}*Ret_{it}); turnover and returns (Turn_{it}*Ret_{it}); news, turnover, and returns (news_{it}*Turn_{it}*Ret_{it}); firm size and returns (size_{it}*Ret_{it}); and news and turnover (news_{it}*Turn_{it}). Other controls include size (Size_{it}), book-to-market (BM_{it}), annual return momentum (Mom_{it}), and monthly return volatility (TVol_{it}). I estimate Equation (15) daily using all firms much like Fama and MacBeth (1973). The point estimate is the time series average of the daily regression coefficients. The Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses below are robust to autocorrelation up to 10 daily lags and heteroscedasticity in the daily coefficient estimates. The five columns denote subsamples used to estimate Equation (15): all trading days, excluding nonearnings news, excluding earnings news, and pre- and post-1997. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels.

increase in momentum of daily returns on news days but only a 0.5% increase in momentum of daily returns on nonnews days. These percentages correspond to volume-induced momentum magnitudes of 19 bps and 3 bps over days [2,10] for news and nonnews days, respectively. Together, the first and second key results imply that the average news story reduces return reversal and that high-volume news stories reduce return reversal by an even larger amount.

To summarize these first two results, Figure 2 shows stylized calculations of the predicted percentage of a stock’s daily return that is reversed in four situations: when news occurs (news_{it} = 0.702), when news does not occur
Figure 2
The impact of news on return reversal and volume-induced momentum

Figure 2 shows how the percentage reversal of a daily return depends on the news and trading volume observed on that day. The calculations in the figure come directly from the regression estimates of the four coefficients \((b_1, b_2, b_3, \text{ and } b_4)\) in Equation (15):

\[
\text{Ret}_{i,t+2,t+10} = a + b_1 \times \text{Ret}_{i,t} + b_2 \times \text{news}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t} + b_3 \times \text{Turn}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t} + b_4 \times \text{news}_{i,t} \times \text{Turn}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t} + c \times \text{Controls}_{i,t} + e_{i,t} \text{ for all } i, t.
\]

Table 1 reports these four coefficients on the variables \(\text{Ret}_{i,t}\), \(\text{news}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t}\), \(\text{Turn}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t}\), and \(\text{news}_{i,t} \times \text{Turn}_{i,t} \times \text{Ret}_{i,t}\). I compute the predicted value of the dependent variable when there is no news with high turnover, no news with low turnover, news with high turnover, and news with low turnover in the four sets of bars below. The value of \(\text{news}_{i,t}\) is equal to either 0.702 or \(-0.099\), depending on news or no news. For high or low turnover, the value of abnormal turnover is the 90th or 10th percentile of the turnover distribution conditional on news. The dark gray, light gray, and black bars denote three sets of coefficient estimates for the news- and volume-related return momentum in three subsamples: all trading days, excluding earnings news, and excluding nonearnings news. Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1 report these coefficient values.

\(\text{news}_{i,t} = -0.099\), when turnover conditional on news is high (90th percentile), and when turnover conditional on news is low (10th percentile). The four sets of bars in Figure 2 represent the predicted return reversal for all four combinations of news, nonnews, high turnover, and low turnover. The dark gray, light gray, and black bars show how these reversals change when the sample includes all news, excludes earnings news, and excludes nonearnings news.

Figure 2 provides a simple graphic interpretation of the first two empirical results. The fact that the first two sets of bars in Figure 2 are statistically and economically significantly lower than the second two sets of bars implies that news, on average, reduces return reversal. The second main result is that the difference between the third and fourth set of bars in Figure 2 is much larger than the difference between the first two sets of bars. This means that volume reduces return reversal but only when it accompanies news. Equivalently, one
could say that public news reduces return reversal more when it accompanies high volume.

The numerous subsample results in Table 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate that the impacts of news on reversal and volume-induced momentum are both quite robust. For example, columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 show that the impact of news on reversals \((\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \text{ coefficient})\) and volume-induced momentum \((\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \text{ coefficient})\) remains similar regardless of the period. This is important because the amount of news changes dramatically from 1979 to 2007—see Figure 1—and because survivorship bias concerns do not apply to the 1997–2007 period.

Another possible concern is that the impact of news on reversal occurs only when news accompanies earnings announcements. If this were true, there would be little incremental benefit to examining news stories beyond examining earnings news, which many other studies do already. To address this concern, the regression in column 2 excludes all the articles without earnings-related news, while the regression in column 3 excludes all the articles with earnings-related news. The definition of earnings-related news is the word-based measure in Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008): an indicator for stories that mention either “earnings” or any other word with the stem “earn.” Using alternative definitions, such as the DJ earnings subject code, produces very similar results, but the DJ earnings subject codes do not exist prior to 1992.

The evidence in columns 2 and 3 suggests that earnings-related news has a greater impact on return reversal than news that does not explicitly mention earnings (8.4% of daily returns vs. 2.9% of daily returns). Nevertheless, news that does not explicitly mention earnings has a large and statistically significant impact on reversal, implying that nonearnings news is an important determinant of the information environment.

The results on earnings-related news in Table 1 and Figure 2 are especially notable because several previous studies argue that earnings news is more informative than nonearnings news. For example, Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) show that earnings news elicits larger market reactions and is a better predictor of firms’ cash flows. Comparing the coefficient on \(\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}\) in rows 2 and 3 in Table 1, one sees that earnings-related news reduces return reversals by a larger amount than nonearnings news. However, a comparison of the two \(\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it}\) coefficients shows that earnings-related news does not reduce volume-induced return reversals by a larger amount than nonearnings news. One interpretation is that the average impact of news on reversal depends on the informativeness of the news, but the impact of high-volume news on reversal does not depend on news informativeness. This distinction will be important for understanding why the impact of news on volume-induced return momentum varies across firms.

The two other coefficients related to return reversals in Table 1 are the size and turnover interaction terms \((\text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \text{ and } \text{size}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it})\). These
coefficients show that reversals are significantly smaller for firms experiencing high abnormal turnover and for small firms. Controlling for the turnover interaction term reduces the magnitude of the news interaction term because turnover and news are positively correlated, and both turnover and news reduce return reversals. Controlling for the size interaction term has the opposite impact on the news interaction term because size increases return reversals. The model’s two key predictions for expected returns hold regardless of whether the regressions include these controls.

The coefficients on all five of the control variables already known to predict expected returns have the expected signs in Table 1. The abnormal turnover (Turn$_{it}$) and return momentum (Mom$_{it}$) variables are the most quantitatively important of these five variables. The volatility effect is also a significant predictor of returns (TVol$_{it}$). However, the size and book-to-market (Size$_{it}$ and BM$_{it}$) effects are somewhat weaker, and only marginally significant. These findings are broadly consistent with other return predictability results for this sample period.

### 3.2 Using Firm and News Characteristics to Isolate the Impact of News

To assess how the impact of news on return reversal varies, I rerun the main regressions in Equation (15) for subsamples sorted by firm size (Size$_{it}$) and four size-adjusted (SA) firm characteristics: stock illiquidity (IlliquiditySA$_{it}$), analyst coverage (AnalystSA$_{it}$), analyst forecast dispersion (DisperSA$_{it}$), and institutional ownership (InstOwnSA$_{it}$). I sort the sample on each trading day $t$ into five quintiles using each of the variables above. Following Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), the illiquidity measure is the daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure averaged over trading day $t-4$ through day $t$. The daily illiquidity measure is equal to $10^6 \times |Ret_{it}|/(Volume_{it})$, where Volume$_{it}$ is the stock’s dollar volume. Analyst coverage for each stock is the number of analysts with yearly earnings forecasts for that stock in the previous calendar month. For all firms with at least two analysts, analyst forecast dispersion (Disper$_{it}$) is the standard deviation of the one-year earnings per share forecasts in the previous calendar month divided by the contemporaneous stock price. A firm’s institutional ownership is the sum of all institutional holdings divided by the firm’s market capitalization at the end of each calendar quarter.

I also test whether the impact of news on reversal varies with the information content of news. I use the log of the number of distinct newswire messages (Msg$_{it}$) that occur for firm $i$ on trading day $t$ as an empirical proxy for information content. This variable is defined only on days in which a firm appears in the news. The idea behind Msg$_{it}$ is that stories consisting of more newswire messages are more likely to be timely, important, and thorough.

Table 2 displays the monthly cross-sectional correlations among daily media coverage, quarterly media coverage, size, illiquidity, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and institutional ownership, along with the newswire messages variable (Msg$_{it}$). The quarterly media coverage variable, News3Mo$_{it}$, is
Table 2 displays the average daily correlations between daily media coverage (\(\text{News}_t\)), quarterly media coverage (\(\text{News3Mo}_t\)), size (\(\text{Size}_t\)), illiquidity (\(\text{Illiquidity}_t\)), analyst coverage (\(\text{Analysts}_t\)), analyst forecast dispersion (\(\text{Disper}_t\)), institutional ownership (\(\text{InstOwn}_t\)), and wire messages (\(\text{Msg}_t\)). The Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses below are robust to autocorrelation up to 250 lags and heteroscedasticity in the daily correlation estimates. Daily media coverage (\(\text{News}_t\)) is a 0 or 1 indicator of whether firm \(i\) has news on day \(t\). Quarterly media coverage (\(\text{News3Mo}_t\)) is the fraction of trading days in which a firm appears in the news during the three most recent calendar months. Illiquidity (\(\text{Illiquidity}_t\)) is the daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure averaged over trading day \(t - 4\) through day \(t\). The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure on day \(t\) is given by \(\frac{10^5 \times |\text{Ret}_t|}{\text{Volume}_t}\) where \(\text{Volume}_t\) is the stock’s dollar volume on day \(t\). Analyst coverage (\(\text{Analysts}_t\)) is the number of analysts with one-year earnings forecasts for a stock in the previous calendar month. Analyst forecast dispersion (\(\text{Disper}_t\)) is the standard deviation of the one-year earnings per share forecasts for a stock in the previous calendar month divided by the contemporaneous stock price. Wire messages (\(\text{Msg}_t\)) is the number of distinct DJ newswire messages for firm \(i\) on day \(t\).

The size-adjustment procedure for illiquidity, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and newswire messages is analogous to the size-adjustment procedure for media coverage described earlier. Taking the illiquidity variable as an example, a firm’s size-adjusted illiquidity is the firm’s illiquidity quintile ranking within its size quintile on day \(t\). The other size-adjusted variables are defined analogously. For the analyst coverage,
analyst forecast dispersion, and institutional ownership adjustments, I restrict the sample to firms with nonmissing information on AnalystsSAit, DisperSAit, and InstOwnSAit before generating the quintile rankings for each of these characteristics. For example, the bottom quintiles of AnalystSAit and InstOwnSAit contain firms with low analyst coverage and low institutional holdings and exclude firms with no coverage and no holdings. I use firm size and the five size-adjusted variables in the regression subsamples reported in Table 3.

For brevity, Table 3 reports only the regression coefficients of primary interest, which are newsit*Retit, Turnit*Retit, and newsit*Turnit*Retit, and only the results within the top and bottom quintiles of each characteristic sort. The first set of three columns examines these three coefficients in the top characteristic quintile, the next set looks at the bottom quintile, and the last set of three columns computes the difference in the three coefficients across the quintiles.

The last two rows of columns 1 and 4 in Table 3 show that the newsit*Retit coefficient depends critically on the number of wire messages on a news day (MsgSAit,). The impact of news on reversal of day 0 firm returns is five times higher when day 0 firm news appears in many distinct newswire messages (i.e., 9.5% vs. 1.9%), which is a statistically significant difference at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the interpretation that stories with many wire messages are more informative than other stories. Several market microstructure models, including the one in Section 1, predict that market reactions to these informative stories would positively predict postnews returns, which is consistent with the results in Table 3.

More generally, columns 1 and 4 in Table 3 show that the newsit*Retit coefficient remains positive, statistically significant, and economically significant in all 12 (6 × 2) firm and news characteristic quintiles. The magnitude of the coefficient varies substantially with firm size (from 2.4% to 4.8% of daily returns), but there is no significant variation across the four size-adjusted firm characteristics. The seventh column in Table 3 shows that the difference in the newsit*Retit coefficient values across the top and bottom size quintiles is significant at the 5% level. One possible interpretation of this is that a typical news story conveys more value-relevant information for small firms, perhaps because more alternative sources of information exist for large firms. By contrast, the newsit*Retit coefficient does not vary with the level of analyst forecast dispersion (DisperSAit). This suggests that alternative belief-based theories of return momentum around news are unable to explain the observed cross-sectional variation in the newsit*Retit coefficient.

The impact of news on volume-induced return momentum (newsit*Turnit*Retit) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in eight of the ten firm characteristic quintile regressions, including the top size quintile—see the first five rows of columns 3 and 6 in Table 3. One exception is the
Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information?

Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients ($b_{1}, b_{2}, b_{3}$, and $b_{4}$) on news $*$ Ret$_{it}$, Turn$_{it}$ $*$ Ret$_{it}$, and news $*$ Turn$_{it}$ $*$ Ret$_{it}$ from the regression in Equation (15):

$$R_{it, t+2, t+10} = a + b_{1} \cdot Ret_{it} + b_{2} \cdot news_{it} + b_{3} \cdot Turn_{it} + b_{4} \cdot news_{it} \cdot Turn_{it} + c \cdot Controls_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \text{ for all } i,$$

where Controls$_{it} = [\text{Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses below are robust to autocorrelation up to 10 daily lags and heteroscedasticity in the daily coefficient estimates. The six rows denote six characteristics used to form subsamples in which I estimate Equation (15). The characteristics are firm size (Size$_{it}$), and five size-adjusted characteristics: illiquidity (IlliquiditySA$_{it}$), analyst coverage (AnalystsSA$_{it}$), analyst forecast dispersion (DisperSA$_{it}$), institutional ownership (InstOwnSA$_{it}$), and newswire messages (MsgSA$_{it}$). The columns show the estimated news$_{it} \cdot Ret_{it}$, Turn$_{it} \cdot Ret_{it}$, and news$_{it} \cdot Turn_{it} \cdot Ret_{it}$ coefficients in the top characteristic-sorted quintile subsample, the bottom quintile subsample, and the difference in the coefficients between the top and bottom quintiles. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels.}
reession with the most liquid firms, where the coefficient is insignificantly positive. For the firms in the bottom size and top illiquidity quintiles, the coefficients on \( \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \) are so large that volume-induced momentum on news days overwhelms the volume-induced reversal on a typical day (negative \( \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \) coefficients). This suggests that news plays an especially important role for small firms and illiquid firms. Furthermore, the impact of news on volume-induced reversal (i.e., the \( \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \) coefficient) differs significantly by illiquidity. Interpreting this finding in the context of the model in Section 1, it is consistent with the joint hypothesis that stock illiquidity is a proxy for information asymmetry, trading volume is a proxy for liquidity provision, and a key role of public news is to resolve information asymmetry. Conversely, if one interprets large returns on high-volume news days as resolving information asymmetry, the results in Table 3 validate illiquidity as a proxy for the presence of asymmetric information.

The \( \text{newsTurnRet} \) coefficient is also close to zero for the top quintile of analyst forecast dispersion. The coefficient \( \text{newsTurnRet} \) is, however, significantly positive in the bottom quintile of forecast dispersion. These two results seem inconsistent with the differences-of-opinion theory of high-volume return momentum. One explanation for this is that forecast dispersion is correlated with another firm characteristic—such as the range of available public signals—that helps to explain variation in the \( \text{newsTurnRet} \) coefficient.

Intriguingly, the last row in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 shows that there is little difference in return momentum for high- and low-volume news days if one controls for a key characteristic of the news itself: the number of newswire messages (\( \text{msgSA}_{it} \)). This suggests that the role of news day volume is to distinguish between informative and uninformative news stories and that the more direct measure of news informativeness partly subsumes this role.

To further scrutinize this result, I add the newswire messages variable (\( \text{msgSA}_{it} \)) and an interaction term with returns (\( \text{msgSA}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \)) to the original regression specification in Equation (15). I demean the newswire message variable by firm size, quintile, and trading day to create a size-adjusted variable (\( \text{msgSA}_{it} \)) with a zero mean. The interaction term with abnormal returns is defined as \( \text{msgSA}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \). To include these two variables in the regressions, I define them to be zero on all nonnews days. This convention does not materially change the coefficients on these variables or the interaction terms from the estimates that one would obtain using only news days. The full regression specification below is the same as Equation (15) with two extra terms:

\[
\text{Ret}_{it+2,t+10} = a + b_1 \times \text{Ret}_{it} + b_2 \times \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} + b_3 \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} \\
+ b_4 \times \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} + d_1 \times \text{msgSA}_{it} \times \text{Ret}_{it} + d_2 \times \text{msgSA}_{it} \\
+ c \times \text{Controls}_{it} + e_{it} \text{ for all } i \text{ on each day } t. \tag{16}
\]
The impact of news characteristics on ten-day ($R_{t,t+2,t+10}$) return reversals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
<td>-0.124**</td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.003$)</td>
<td>($0.003$)</td>
<td>($0.005$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{news}<em>{it} \times R</em>{it}$</td>
<td>0.042**</td>
<td>0.035**</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.004$)</td>
<td>($0.008$)</td>
<td>($0.004$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{msgSA}<em>{it} \times R</em>{it}$</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.004$)</td>
<td>($0.013$)</td>
<td>($0.004$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Turn}<em>{it} \times R</em>{it}$</td>
<td>0.0081**</td>
<td>0.0117**</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.0012$)</td>
<td>($0.0013$)</td>
<td>($0.0025$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{news}<em>{it} \times \text{Turn}</em>{it} \times R_{it}$</td>
<td>0.0100**</td>
<td>0.0105*</td>
<td>0.0099**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.0032$)</td>
<td>($0.0054$)</td>
<td>($0.0038$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{news}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.0001$)</td>
<td>($0.0002$)</td>
<td>($0.0001$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{msgSA}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
<td>-0.0006</td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($0.0001$)</td>
<td>($0.0004$)</td>
<td>($0.0001$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average $R^2$</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg obs per day</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days</td>
<td>7082</td>
<td>4319</td>
<td>2763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from the regression specification in Equation (16) in the text:

$$R_{t,t+2,t+10} = a + b_1 R_{it} + b_2 \text{news}_{it} \times R_{it} + b_3 \text{Turn}_{it} \times R_{it} + b_4 \text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it} \times R_{it} + d_1 \text{msgSA}_{it} R_{it} + d_2 \text{msgSA}_{it} + c \text{Controls}_i + e_i$$

where $\text{Controls}_i = [\text{news}_i, \text{size}_i \times R_{it}, \text{news}_i \times \text{Turn}_{it}, \text{Turn}_{it}, \text{Size}_{it}, \text{BM}_{it}, \text{Mom}_{it}, \text{TVol}_{it}]^T$.

The return reversal, news-related reversal, message-related reversal, and word-length-related reversal coefficients ($b_1$, $b_2$, $d_1$, and $d_2$) are the primary focus. The dependent variable ($R_{t,t+2,t+10}$) is the firm’s raw return from day $t + 2$ to $t + 10$. The independent variables include day-$t$ market-adjusted returns ($R_{it}$), the news indicator ($\text{news}_{it}$), interactions between news and returns ($\text{news}_{it} \times R_{it}$), firm size and returns ($\text{size}_i \times R_{it}$), turnover and returns ($\text{Turn}_{it} \times R_{it}$), and news and turnover ($\text{news}_{it} \times \text{Turn}_{it}$). The $\text{msgSA}_{it}$ variable is the log of the number of newswire messages for firm $i$ on day $t$, adjusted for the average value for each size quintile. Other controls not shown include size ($\text{Size}_{it}$), book-to-market ($\text{BM}_{it}$), annual return momentum ($\text{Mom}_{it}$), monthly return volatility ($\text{TVol}_{it}$), and daily abnormal turnover ($\text{Turn}_{it}$). Lowercase variables denote demeaned variables.

I estimate Equation (16) daily using all firms much like Fama and MacBeth (1973). The coefficient estimate is the time series average of the daily cross-sectional regression coefficients. The Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses below are robust to autocorrelation up to 10 daily lags and heteroscedasticity in the daily coefficient estimates. The three columns denote estimates of Equation (16) in three subsamples: all trading days, pre-1997, and post-1997. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels.

Table 4 displays the coefficient estimates on the two message variables, along with the coefficients on the key news and reversal terms. The main result is that the coefficient on the new interaction term ($\text{msgSA}_{it} \times R_{it}$) has the expected signs and is highly statistically significant in all specifications. That is, news stories consisting of more wire messages are better predictors of reduced return reversal. For an SD 2 increase in newswire messages (+1.22), the estimates in column 1 show that return reversal decreases by 3.4% of daily returns. This magnitude is comparable to the magnitude of unconditional return reversal for news days (6.4% of daily returns). The other columns in Table 4 show that the estimates remain robust regardless of the regression specification and time period. In summary, the news stories with the most informative characteristics are the most powerful predictors of lower return reversal. This

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9 The coefficients on the control variables that are not shown change by very little in these specifications.
is consistent with the models in Section 1, Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Wang (1994), Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), and LMSW (2002). It also supports the view that the public news indicator variable is a noisy proxy for public information arrival.

The differences between the consistently positive and significant coefficients on $news_{it} * Turn_{it} * Ret_{it}$ in Table 4 and the trivial and insignificant coefficients on $news_{it} * Turn_{it} * Ret_{it}$ in the last two rows of Table 3 are noteworthy. The Table 4 regressions include all news stories across all news characteristic quintiles. In these regressions, although the coefficient on $news_{it} * Turn_{it} * Ret_{it}$ (0.0094) is only half the magnitude of the original Table 1 coefficient (0.0188), news day volume retains significant predictive ability for future returns. The Table 3 regressions include subsets of news stories within the same newswire message quintile. In these subsample regressions, variation in news day volume does not seem to predict returns. This suggests that the number of newswire messages subsumes much, but not all, of the informational role of volume. From a theoretical perspective, trading volume accompanying the release of information is just a proxy for the resolution of information asymmetry. If one could accurately measure the informational content of the public signal, trading volume would play no role.

In summary, news on day 0 predicts a lower reversal of the day 0 return in days 2 to 10, and high-volume news predicts an even lower reversal of the day 0 return in days 2 to 10. The first result suggests that the informational role of news dominates any link between news and liquidity shocks.10 The second result is consistent with the idea that volume that accompanies news is more likely to result from asymmetric information than asymmetric liquidity shocks.

4. The Contemporaneous Relationship Between Order Flows, Returns, and News

Here, I explore possible mechanisms for why news day returns predict post-news returns. The theoretical model in Section 1, along with several other models, such as Wang (1994) and LMSW (2002), makes two predictions concerning the contemporaneous relationship between returns and order flows: (i) the correlation between absolute returns and volume temporarily increases while information asymmetry is being resolved; and (ii) the price impact of informed order flow temporarily decreases while information asymmetry is low. I test these two predictions using an approach similar to an event study around news events.

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10 This inference receives further support from the results in Engelberg (2008) and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008). These papers show that negative words contained in news stories convey negative information about firms’ cash flows.
4.1 Correlations Between Absolute Returns and Trading Volume Around News

I measure the contemporaneous association between absolute returns and volume using the simple univariate regression in Equation (17):

\[ \text{Turn}_{it} = \text{Intercept} + \text{Slope} \times |\text{Ret}_{it}| + e_{it} \text{ for all } i, t. \] (17)

The goal of this regression is not to assert causality but to measure the association between absolute returns and volume. Switching the independent and dependent variables does not change their underlying correlation. Because the theoretical prediction is that the total correlation between absolute returns and volume increases as information asymmetry is resolved, Equation (17) omits other contemporaneously measured variables. However, in an empirical setting, variables other than information asymmetry could affect the correlation between volume and absolute returns. To control for these variables, I examine changes in the volume–absolute return correlation before and after the same news events—i.e., in event time. Including other variables in Equation (17) affects the magnitude of the partial correlation between volume and absolute returns but does not affect the qualitative results below.

Table 5 reports the details of the estimates of Equation (17) using daily cross-sectional regressions. The parentheses below the coefficients contain Newey and West (1987) standard errors that allow for autocorrelation of up to three daily lags in the time series of coefficients. The daily regressions in Equation (17) are not based on observations with overlapping time intervals, because all variables are measured on the same trading day. Table 5 reports the average slope, intercept, \( R^2 \), and correlation coefficients for these daily

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>No News</th>
<th>Nonearnings News</th>
<th>Earnings News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(</td>
<td>\text{Ret}_{it}</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>11.9**</td>
<td>14.4**</td>
<td>11.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.205**</td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
<td>-0.215**</td>
<td>-0.080**</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg obs per day</td>
<td>2532</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2217</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days</td>
<td>7132</td>
<td>7132</td>
<td>7132</td>
<td>4434</td>
<td>4434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 reports regression coefficients and correlation coefficients based on Equation (17) in the text:

\[ \text{Turn}_{it} = \text{Intercept} + \text{Slope} \times |\text{Ret}_{it}| + e_{it} \text{ for all } i, t. \]

The dependent variable is abnormal daily turnover (\( \text{Turn}_{it} \)); and the independent variable is absolute daily returns \( |\text{Ret}_{it}| \). To control for variables aside from information asymmetry that could affect the correlation between absolute returns and volume, I examine changes in the correlation before and after the same news events in Panel B. I estimate Equation (17) using daily cross-sectional regressions. In parentheses, I report Newey and West (1987) standard errors that allow for autocorrelation of up to three daily lags in the time series of coefficients. Panel A in Table 5 reports the average slope, intercept, \( R^2 \), and correlation coefficients for these monthly regressions. The five columns denote five different subsamples in which I estimate Equation (17): all days, days with news, days without news, days with nonearnings-related news, and days with earnings-related news. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. To avoid clutter, I suppress all asterisks for the raw correlations.
regressions. The five columns denote five different subsamples in which I estimate Equation (17): all days, days with news, days without news, days with earnings-related news, and days with nonearnings news. Not surprisingly, there is a strong positive relationship between absolute returns and trading volume in all subsamples. More interestingly, the $R^2$ of the regression increases from just 6.0% on nonnews days, to 17.2% on nonearnings news days, and to 36.6% on earnings news days, suggesting that the correlation between absolute returns and volume is related to the informativeness of public news events.

In unreported results, I compute the monthly average of the daily correlation between absolute returns and abnormal turnover on days with news and days without news, and the difference between these two correlations. This analysis shows that the differences in the average correlation coefficients between news days and nonnews days are positive for all 342 months in the sample. The news correlation consistently exceeds the nonnews correlation in the post-1997 period, indicating that survivorship bias in the pre-1997 period is not driving the results.

The firms in the news and no-news subsamples are quite different in terms of size, volatility, turnover, and other dimensions that could affect the correlation between absolute returns and volume. Therefore, I use an event study approach to create a “no-news” group of firms with the same firm composition as the news group. I estimate Equation (17) in 21 different subsamples that include absolute returns and abnormal turnover for all firms with news exactly $k$ days ago, where $k$ is an integer ranging from –10 to +10 days relative to the news event. This produces a cross-sectional correlation between absolute returns and volume for each $k$ value.

Figure 3 displays the correlation coefficients from these 21 regressions. The correlation between absolute returns and volume rises rapidly before a public news event and declines rapidly after a news event occurs. Figure 3 shows how the cross-sectional relationship in Table 5 changes over time, before and after a news event.

There are at least two possible reasons why the correlation between absolute returns and abnormal turnover is higher on days with news stories. The microstructure explanation suggested by the model in Section 1 is that relatively uninformed traders learn about expected returns when news resolves information asymmetry. These traders buy when they learn that expected returns are high. An alternative explanation for the correlation between absolute returns and volume is that investors are more likely to trade a stock when an event draws their attention to the stock market. In fact, Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are more likely to buy the stocks of firms that experience extreme abnormal return events and firms that are in the news. This aggressive buying activity could increase volume on days with extreme returns, particularly if news accompanies extreme returns.

To investigate the plausibility of the stories based on microstructure models and Barber and Odean’s (2008) behavioral finding, I estimate Equation (17)
Figure 3
The correlation between absolute returns and volume around public news

Figure 3 reports the correlation between absolute returns and abnormal turnover on 21 different days, ranging from 10 days before a news event occurs to 10 days after the event. The correlation coefficients come from daily cross-sectional regressions based on Equation (17):

\[
\text{Turn}_{it} = \text{Intercept} + \text{Slope} \times |\text{Ret}_{it}| + \epsilon_{it}, \text{ for all } i \text{ on day } t.
\]

The independent variable is absolute daily returns \(|\text{Ret}_{it}|\); and the dependent variable is abnormal daily turnover \((\text{Turn}_{it})\). To estimate the correlation between absolute returns and volume \(k\) days after a news event, I estimate Equation (17) using only observations in which a firm experienced a news event \(k\) days ago. Repeating this procedure for integer values of \(k\) ranging from -10 to +10 generates the figure below. See Table 5 for further estimation details.

For news days, prenews days, and postnews days within subsamples sorted by firm characteristics. I use \(k = -10\) and +10 as the prenews and postnews days—other values of \(k\) give similar results. Panel A in Table 6 reports the volume–absolute return correlation from subsamples sorted by several news event characteristics: all news, no news, earnings news, no earnings news, and high and low newswire messages \((\text{MsgSA}_{it})\). Panel B in Table 6 reports the correlations for subsamples sorted by the firm characteristics used earlier: size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and illiquidity.

For the top and bottom quintiles of illiquidity, the table also reports the correlation from three subsamples sorted by the number of days elapsed \((k = -10, 0, \text{ or } +10)\) since a nonnews event occurred. This allows for a difference-in-difference comparison of the postnews and post-nonnews change in correlations between liquid and illiquid stocks. The third difference is an effective control for possible differences in the mean reversion of prenews liquidity.
in liquid and illiquid stocks if one assumes that mean reversion in liquidity affects both the postnews and post-nonnews changes in correlations equally. The microstructure models predict that the correlation between absolute returns and volume should decline by more after news that resolves more asymmetric information, whereas the attention-based mechanism should be strongest for stocks with the highest individual and lowest institutional ownership.

The postnews differences in correlations displayed in Table 6 generally support the information asymmetry explanation. For example, LSMW (2002) argue that asymmetric information is more prevalent in small stocks and illiquid

Table 6
Volume–absolute return correlation sorted by firm and news characteristics

Panel A: Correlations Between Turn{t+k} and |Ret{t+k}| on Day t + k Sorted by Type of News on Day t

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Day t − 10 Correlation</th>
<th>Day t Correlation</th>
<th>Day t + 10 Correlation</th>
<th>Post-Event Difference</th>
<th>Pre-Post Event Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News on day t</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>−0.153**</td>
<td>−0.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No news on day t</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.032**</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.185**</td>
<td>−0.012**</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings news on day t</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>−0.290**</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonearnings news on t</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>−0.107**</td>
<td>−0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.201**</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsgSA{it}</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>−0.315**</td>
<td>−0.034**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(News on day t)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>−0.075**</td>
<td>−0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.302**</td>
<td>−0.025**</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Average Price Impact on Day t + k Sorted by Firm Characteristic on Day t

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Day t − 10 Price Impact</th>
<th>Day t Price Impact</th>
<th>Day t + 10 Price Impact</th>
<th>Post-Event Difference</th>
<th>Pre-Post Event Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size{it}</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>−0.04*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.54** (0.01)</td>
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<td>0.91 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.10** (0.01)</td>
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<td>1.06 (0.01)</td>
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<td>-0.40** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.15** (0.01)</td>
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<td>(News vs. none)</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
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</table>

Table 6 reports only the correlation coefficients based on Equation (17) in the text:

$$\text{Turn}_{it} = \text{Intercept} + \text{Slope}\cdot |\text{Ret}_{it}| + e_{it}$$

for all $i$ on each day $t$. The dependent variable is abnormal daily turnover ($\text{Turn}_{it}$); and the independent variable is absolute daily returns ($|\text{Ret}_{it}|$). The first three columns indicate the correlation between absolute returns and volume ten days prior to news ($t - 10$), on the day of news ($t$), and ten days after news ($t + 10$). I examine changes in the correlation between absolute returns and volume before and after the same news events in the last two columns. I obtain these estimates from regressions of Equation (17) in three different subsamples that include absolute returns and volume for firms with news events exactly $k$ days ago, where $k$ is equal to either $-10$, $0$, or $+10$ days relative to the news event. The post-event difference is the correlation on day $t + 10$ minus the correlation on day $t$, whereas the pre-post event difference is the correlation on day $t + 10$ minus the correlation on day $t - 10$. I estimate Equation (17) using daily cross-sectional regressions. In parentheses, I report Newey and West (1987) standard errors that allow for autocorrelation of up to three daily lags in the time series of coefficients. The rows in the panels indicate the news or firm characteristic subsample in which I estimate the correlation between absolute returns and volume. Panel A compares news days versus nonnews days, earnings news days versus nonearnings news days, earnings news days versus nonnews days, and news days with newswire messages in the top vs. bottom quintile. Panel B compares the top and bottom quintiles of size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and illiquidity. The last seven rows analyze correlations around no-news events in both illiquidity quintiles and the difference-in-difference (DDiff) in correlations between the two liquidity quintiles for news and nonnews events. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. I suppress all asterisks for the raw correlations.

stocks. Row 3 in Panel B in Table 6 indicates that the postnews decline in the correlation between absolute returns and volume is significantly larger (by 0.119) for stocks in the bottom size quintile than for stocks in the top quintile. Similarly, row 15 in Panel B shows that correlations decline by 0.018 more for stocks in the top size-adjusted liquidity quintile than for stocks in the bottom quintile. The last (DDiff) row in Panel B shows that controlling for differences in the mean reversion of liquidity makes this decline appear even larger (0.034). These results are consistent with the idea that news plays a greater role in resolving information asymmetry for small stocks and illiquid stocks. The evidence on the number of newswires ($\text{MsgSA}_{it}$) in the last three rows in Panel A of Table 6 also suggests that news accompanies the release of asymmetric information. The decline in correlation between absolute returns
and volume (from 0.616 to 0.302) is especially large in the ten days after news stories consisting of many wire messages.

Table 6 offers less support for the attention-based story, but one cannot rule it out altogether. Contrary to the attention-based story, the impact of news on the correlation between absolute returns and volume is larger in stocks with high institutional (not individual) ownership. One possible explanation is that information asymmetry is higher in these stocks. The empirical correlation does not change significantly when analyst coverage varies. Analyst coverage is difficult to interpret in light of the two competing theories. Although low coverage stocks presumably have higher information asymmetry, they could also have fewer individual investors with behavioral biases if analyst coverage attracts investor attention. Overall, the evidence for this particular attention-based mechanism is somewhat weak.

A third alternative, suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993), is that differences in investor interpretations of news produce the correlation between volume and absolute returns. If so, one might expect stocks where these differences are strongest (e.g., stocks with high analyst forecast dispersion) to exhibit the highest correlations. The DisperSA_{it} row in Table 6 shows that this holds true during nonnews periods, but the opposite occurs on news days. This fact is difficult to reconcile with a story in which differential investor interpretations of public news give rise to the correlation between volume and absolute returns on news days.

4.2 The Price Impact of Order Flow Around News

The microstructure model in Section 1 predicts that price impact of trading will temporarily decline around news events if news resolves asymmetric information. I test this theory using event tests similar to those in the previous subsection. To obtain a noisy proxy for the price impact of informed trading, I assume that informed signed order flow is positively correlated with total signed order flow. I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign total order flow in the databases of the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) and TAQ. The definition of price impact is the ratio of the covariance of total signed order flow and returns to the variance of total signed order flows, which is equivalent to a univariate regression coefficient of returns on total signed order flows. For each firm on each day, I compute this covariance and variance using 5-minute intervals to aggregate signed order flows and returns.

Informed traders may trade in larger quantities than uninformed traders (e.g., Barber, Odean, and Zhu 2009); accordingly, I measure total signed order flows using the number of shares in each transaction. The price impact results, below, would be different if I used the number of transactions, which would give greater weight to small trades that may be less informed. The share-weighted price impact measure is equal to the percentage price impact of transacting 1% of the firm’s total shares outstanding, which matches the theoretical construct in Proposition 4.
I measure the cross-sectional average of price impact for all firms ten days before, during, and ten days after they experience news events. Panel A in Table 7 reports these averages within subsamples sorted by several news event characteristics: all news, no news, earnings news, no earnings news, and high and low newswire messages ($\text{MsgSA}_{it}$). Panel B shows price impacts around news events sorted by firm characteristics: size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and illiquidity. In the top and bottom quintile of each characteristic, the table reports the average price impact from three subsamples sorted by the number of days elapsed ($k = -10, 0, \text{ or } +10$)

Table 7
Intraday price impact sorted by firm and news characteristics

Panel A: Average Price Impact on Day $t + k$ Sorted by News Characteristic on Day $t$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Day $t - 10$ Price Impact</th>
<th>Day $t$ Price Impact</th>
<th>Day $t + 10$ Price Impact</th>
<th>Post-Event Difference</th>
<th>Pre-Post Event Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News on day $t$</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
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<td>No news on day $t$</td>
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<td>1.78</td>
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<td>-0.01**</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earnings news on day $t$</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td>-0.05**</td>
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<td>Nonearnings news on $t$</td>
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<td>1.59</td>
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<td>$\text{MsgSA}_{it}$</td>
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<td>1.62</td>
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(continued)
For firms and news events with different characteristics, Table 7 reports firms’ average share-weighted price impact before, during, and after news and non-news events. Share-weighted price impact is based on total signed order flows and returns measured at 5-minute intraday intervals. I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign total order flow in the ISSM and TAQ databases. Price impact is the ratio of the covariance of share-weighted signed order flow and returns to the variance of share-weighted signed order flows. The share-weighted price impact measure is equal to the percentage price impact of transacting one percent of the firm’s total shares outstanding. The first three columns indicate the average price impact of order flow ten days prior to a firm event ($t-10$), on the event day ($t$), and ten days after the event ($t+10$). I examine changes in price impact before and after the events in the last two columns. In parentheses, I report Newey and West (1987) standard errors that allow for autocorrelation of up to three daily lags in the time series of average price impacts. The rows in the two panels indicate the news or firm characteristic subsample in which I estimate average price impact around news or non-news events. Panel A compares price impact on news days versus non-news days, earnings news days versus nonearnings news days, and news days with newswire messages in the top vs. bottom quintile. Panel B compares price impact around news in the top and bottom quintiles of size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and illiquidity. The last seven rows analyze price impact around no-news events in both illiquidity quintiles and the difference-in-difference (DDiff) in correlations between the two liquidity quintiles for news and non-news events. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. I suppress all asterisks for the raw price impacts.

Table 7
Continued

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<td>1.50</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td>–0.54**</td>
<td>–0.10**</td>
<td>–0.10**</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IlliquiditySA</th>
<th>DDiff</th>
<th>0.20**</th>
<th>0.01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(News vs. none)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For firms and news events with different characteristics, Table 7 reports firms’ average share-weighted price impact before, during, and after news and non-news events. Share-weighted price impact is based on total signed order flows and returns measured at 5-minute intraday intervals. I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign total order flow in the ISSM and TAQ databases. Price impact is the ratio of the covariance of share-weighted signed order flow and returns to the variance of share-weighted signed order flows. The share-weighted price impact measure is equal to the percentage price impact of transacting one percent of the firm’s total shares outstanding. The first three columns indicate the average price impact of order flow ten days prior to a firm event ($t-10$), on the event day ($t$), and ten days after the event ($t+10$). I examine changes in price impact before and after the events in the last two columns. In parentheses, I report Newey and West (1987) standard errors that allow for autocorrelation of up to three daily lags in the time series of average price impacts. The rows in the two panels indicate the news or firm characteristic subsample in which I estimate average price impact around news or non-news events. Panel A compares price impact on news days versus non-news days, earnings news days versus nonearnings news days, and news days with newswire messages in the top vs. bottom quintile. Panel B compares price impact around news in the top and bottom quintiles of size, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, institutional ownership, and illiquidity. The last seven rows analyze price impact around no-news events in both illiquidity quintiles and the difference-in-difference (DDiff) in correlations between the two liquidity quintiles for news and non-news events. The * and ** symbols denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. I suppress all asterisks for the raw price impacts.

I infer the magnitude of the temporary decline in price impact around news by measuring the postnews increase in price impact. Panel A in Table 7 reports that the average drop in price impact around news is economically and statistically significant: starting from an impact of 1.64% prior to the news, to 1.58% on the news day, and to 1.63% after the news. A difference of 0.06% implies that a buyer-initiated trade of 1% of a firm’s shares outstanding results in a 0.06% higher firm stock price. This increase of 0.06% is 3.3% of the 1.58% price impact on a news day. If the correlation between informed trading and

since a news event occurred. For the top and bottom quintiles of illiquidity, the table also reports the average price impact from three subsamples sorted by the number of days ($k = -10, 0, +10$) since a non-news event occurred. As before, this comparison of the postnews and post-nonnews change in price impact in liquid and illiquid stocks adjusts for possible differences in the mean reversion of prenews liquidity in liquid and illiquid stocks.
total signed order flows is much less than one, this 3.3% change in price impact greatly underestimates the economic effect of public news.

To examine the time horizon of the price impact effect, I compute price impact in each of the ten days before and after news events. Figure 4 displays the result of this analysis. Price impact after news is materially lower than price impact before news at horizons of at least five trading days. For example, impact on day $t - 1$ is 1.63%, whereas impact on day $t + 1$ is 1.59%. This 0.04% decrease is statistically significant at the 5% level. The decline in price impact from ten days before to ten days after news, however, is just 0.01%, which is insignificant at the 5% level—see column 6 in Table 7.

Table 7 also allows for comparisons of the postnews increase in price impact across news events and firms with different characteristics. The rows in Panel A show that the postnews increase in price impact is much higher for newswires that mention firm earnings and that occur in multiple messages. The rows in Panel B in Table 7 show that firms with illiquid stocks experience a 0.20% higher postnews change in price impact than firms with liquid stocks. Small stocks experience a 0.04% higher postnews change in price impact than large stocks. These four results are consistent with the idea that news resolves

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**Figure 4**

The price impact of order flow before and after public news events

For each of the ten days before and after firm news events, Figure 4 reports the daily price impact of signed order flow. I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign order flows as buyer initiated or seller initiated. In each five-minute interval in a trading day, I aggregate share-weighted order flows—as a percentage of shares outstanding—and calculate stock returns. Price impact is the covariance of five-minute returns and five-minute order flows, divided by the variance of five-minute order flows. This figure shows the cross-sectional average of price impact for all firms experiencing a news event $k$ days ago, where $k$ is an integer ranging from $-10$ to $+10$. See text for further estimation details.
information asymmetry: Earnings news and news with multiple wire messages are likely to be informative, and prenews information asymmetry is likely to be higher in small and illiquid stocks. The last notable finding in Panel B is that the postnews change in price impact is actually higher for stocks with low analyst forecast dispersion, which seems inconsistent with differences-of-opinion explanations for price impact. In addition, the pervasive result that price impact declines temporarily around news seems at odds with the Kim and Verrecchia’s (1994) idea that some investors have superior interpretations of news, which would generate rather than resolve information asymmetries.

5. Concluding Discussion

This study shows that public news predicts substantially lower ten-day reversals of daily stock returns and higher ten-day volume-induced momentum in daily returns. News also coincides with temporarily higher correlations between absolute returns and volume and temporarily lower price impacts. These facts are consistent with the microstructure model in Section 1 but are inconsistent with several alternative theories in which investors interpret news differently or exhibit behavioral biases in processing news. The negative impact of news on return reversals suggests that news events accompany the revelation of information more often than they accompany liquidity shocks. The positive impact of news on volume-induced return momentum suggests that news resolves asymmetrically held information. Cross-sectional variation in this finding suggests that news resolves more asymmetric information in illiquid stocks. The temporary increase in the correlation between absolute returns and volume during news, particularly earnings news, provides further evidence that news resolves asymmetric information. The increase in this correlation is again larger in illiquid stocks and in small stocks, where information asymmetry is likely to be high. Similarly, the temporary decrease in price impact during news suggests that news resolves information asymmetry, particularly in illiquid stocks.

Depending on the news day volume, the predictive power of news for return reversals ranges from 17 bps to 33 bps over a nine-day span. These magnitudes could represent part of the compensation for the uninformed traders who provide liquidity to informed traders in the model in Section 1 and in the models by Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Wang (1994), Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), and LMSW (2002). In this interpretation, good public news reveals that future cash flows are high and that past liquidity shocks to informed traders were low. There are at least two explanations for why prices rapidly increase in a two-week span following this good news, rather than increasing gradually as the stock pays dividends. One possibility is that the negative liquidity shocks experienced by informed traders dissipate in the two weeks after the news, which would alleviate negative price pressure. A second possibility is that uninformed traders supply liquidity gradually over the next two weeks, rather than acting instantly after the news.
The results here show that public news plays a key role in informing some investors but not others. If certain investors are able to predict and trade on the information that will be released in the news, news will have a muted impact on prices. This could help explain Roll’s (1988) finding that public news cannot, by itself, account for a substantial portion of stock return volatility.

Nevertheless, the resolution of asymmetric information through news is associated with trading volume—this news day volume, in combination with news day returns, predicts future returns. Somewhat surprisingly, the number of newswire messages subsumes much of the predictive power of news day trading volume. The ability to predict future returns using such crude measures of informational content is encouraging for future research on public news.

References


Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information?


